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NOTES
PRE-IMPACT PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES IN
AVIATION ACCIDENTS
"It was a crowded plane on a crowded route. Yumi Ochiai, a
26-year-old off-duty assistant purser for Japan Air Lines, was flying
from Tokyo to Osaka when, 13 minutes into the flight, she was startled
by a bang directly over her head. 'My ears started to hurt... and the
whole cabin was filled with a white cloud.' Ochiai could see 'blue sky'
through the Boeing 747SR's ceiling and cushions began flying around
the plane. 'We are making an emergency descent' scratched a prere-
corded message, 'please fasten your seat belts and extinguish all
cigarettes.'
By then JAL Flight 123 had begun to pitch and yaw violently.
Ochiai helped flight attendants demonstrate how to put on life jackets
and curl up in preparation for a crash. Then she returned to her seat
at the rear of the plane. The rest she remembers as a terrifying blur.
'The children were crying 'Mommy!' and because there was panic there
were screams.' Suddenly, Flight 123 began what seemed to her an almost
vertical plunge. ''
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, in aviation accident litigation, there is a trend
toward permitting recovery for negligently inflicted mental anguish
suffered in the moments immediately preceding death. Recovery for
"pre-impact" pain and suffering, while not. unprecedented, is a rela-
1. Excerpt from What Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 1985, at 14. Mrs.
Ochiai and three other passengers survived the August 12, 1985, crash of Japan Air Lines
(JAL) flight 123. The Boeing 747 aircraft crashed into a mountain near Tokyo, killing
520 people. The evidence indicated that the aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudders
broke away, causing it to circle erratically while losing pressure and altitude. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1985, at A8, col. 2. The pilot tried to steer the aircraft by alternatively
increasing power to the left and right engines. This maneuver produced a rolling mo-
tion. Last Minutes of JAL 123, TIME, Aug. 26, 1985, at 22. The pilot kept the stricken
747 in the air for at least 32 minutes after the tail damage was sustained. Id. at 23.
An eyewitness who observed the crash from the ground said: "All of a sudden a big
airplane appeared from between the mountains,...four times it leaned to the left, and
each time it tried to recover its balance to the right. It was flying just like a stagger-
ing drunk." Id. at 22.
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tively new area of tort damages that has been brought to the atten-
tion of trial practitioners by recent cases arising out of aviation ac-
cidents.2 Courts applying New York, Illinois, Texas, and Louisiana law
have permitted recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering.' As pre-
impact verdicts become publicized, they will undoubtedly encourage
trial lawyers in other states to attempt to persuade courts to inter-
pret wrongful death" and survival statutes5 so as to allow damages
for pre-impact terror.'
Pre-impact damages are most often sought in aviation accident
cases because frequently a measurable period of mental anguish can
be shown between the time a mid-air collision or engine malfunction
occurs and the time of death.7 Under these circumstances it's likely
that passengers experience at least a few seconds of intense mental
anguish preceding impact and instantaneous death.
Pre-impact damages have been awarded in only a few wrongful
death cases. Trial lawyers typically have not sought pre-impact
damages for several reasons. First, the courts have consistently ig-
nored the compensable reality of negligently inflicted emotional
distress Second, pre-impact pain and suffering is difficult to establish
because the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence.' Frequently,
there is no eyewitness testimony to corroborate the decedent's
asserted pre-impact pain and suffering. ° Problems of proof and valua-
2. See infra note 9, at 1-2.
3. See infra note 9, at 1-2.
4. See, e.g., The Michigan Wrongful Death Statute, MICH. STAT. ANN. S 27A.
292(2) n.1, permits recovery for pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by such
deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the inflicting of
such injuries and [one's] death to the extent that it can be determined. In Platt v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1983), the court concluded
that the Michigan Wrongful Death Act should be interpreted to permit recovery for
pre-impact pain and suffering.
5. Basically, survival statutes provide in effect that an action for personal
injuries survives the death of the injured party. Survival statutes are designed to
allow recovery by the personal representative on behalf of the decedent's estate for
damages the decedent himself might have recovered had he not died. S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH S 3.1 (2d ed. 1975).
6. The terms pre-impact pain and suffering, pre-impact terror, and pre-impact
mental anguish are used interchangeably in this note. These terms refer to emotional
distress endured by decedents immediately prior to death.
7. See infra note 53.
8. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 327 (4th ed. 1971).
9. Fuchsberg, Damages for Pre-Impact Terror In Air Crashes, Other Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 4.
10. Id.
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tion of pre-impact damages is compounded by the fact that pre-impact
pain and suffering is transient in nature." Plaintiffs have been
discouraged from seeking pre-impact damages because a few courts
have held that claims for pre-impact pain and suffering are too
speculative.'2
The recent rash of major aircraft disasters, 3 such as the Japan
Airlines Flight 123 crash and the American Airlines Flight 191 wreck
at Chicago's O'Hare Airport,14 has awakened the trial bar and the
public to the brief but intense mental anguish experienced by
passengers aboard an aircraft that is plummeting toward the earth.
Plaintiffs seeking pre-impact damages are forcing courts to examine
the issue of whether we have a right to be free from emotional distress
in the moments immediately preceding death. Several courts, recogniz-
ing the intense mental anguish associated with the realization of im-
minent doom, have allowed recovery of pre-impact damages upon
proper proof of the decedent's awareness of impending death.'5
However, courts applying Illinois law require plaintiffs to show
"physical manifestations" of the decedent's emotional distress, a re-
quirement that appears to be an insurmountable obstacle."6
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Demario v. Eastern Airlines Inc., No. 76-267 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
16, 1981). The Demario case arose out of the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 66 at
John F. Kennedy International Airport. The plaintiffs proffered testimony from sur-
vivors of the crash as to the path that the aircraft followed and as to their awareness
beforehand that the aircraft was going to crash. In addition, the National Traffic Safety
Board Accident Report established that the aircraft encountered violent "wind shear"
causing passengers to be thrown about the cabin. A surviving flight attendant testified
seeing the cabin emergency lights illuminate and oxygen masks drop from their re-
tainers. In spite of this evidence, the court concluded evidence of the decedent's
awareness of impending death was "too speculative."
13. Most Deaths in a Year, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1985, at A3, col. 3-4 by the
Associated Press:
The International Civil Aviation Organization, an aviation agency af-
filiated with the United Nations reported that 1985 was already the worst
year in the history of civil aviation, with 15 accidents and more than 1,400
people killed. Previously, 1974 ranked as the worst year for aviation safe-
ty, with 1299 deaths.
14. See infra note 79.
15. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 29. The physical manifestations requirement limits recovery
to only those plaintiffs who exhibit observable injuries or physical symptoms brought
about by emotional distress. The physical manifestations requirement has been satisfied
by such conditions as high blood pressure, weight loss, gastric disturbances, traumatic
neurosis, sleeplessness, etc.
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In addressing the issue of whether or not the brief but intense
mental anguish associated with the realization of impending death war-
rants compensation, this note will briefly trace the historical develop-
ment of emotional distress torts. Second, this note will examine the
precedent for pre-impact damages and analyze recent pre-impact cases
from New York, Illinois, Texas, and Louisiana. Third, this note will
address the issue of speculation as to a decedent's pre-impact pain
and suffering, a problem that is inherent in air disaster cases where
eyewitness testimony is unavailable. Fourth, this note will suggest
that jurors are capable of making a reasonable valuation of a dece-
dent's pre-impact pain and suffering. Finally, the note will discuss the
practical importance of seeking pre-impact damages.
HISTORY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TORTS
Traditionally, the legal right to emotional tranquility has received
little protection from the courts. 7 Although courts have consistently
permitted recovery for pain and suffering incident to a physical in-
jury, they have been reluctant to recognize liability for mental distress
as an independent basis for recovery. 8 The primary reasons given
for denying recovery for emotional distress have been the possibility
of feigned or trivial claims due to the inherent difficulty in measur-
ing mental distress and the exposure of defendants to unlimited liabil-
ity.19
While recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress has
been allowed in some jurisdictions, arbitrary restrictions such as the
17. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 665 (1956); Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035
(1936).
18. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 327-30 (4th ed. 1971). Spade v. Lynn
& B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1887); See also Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in
New York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
409 (1932); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497
(1922); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 260 (1921).
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896)
(permitting recovery for emotional distress would lead to a flood of litigation, would
allow ficticious and speculative claims, and would lead to recovery for injuries which
were not the natural results of the negligent act); Chittrick v. Philadelphia Rapid Trans.
Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909) (mental injury, by nature, is easily feigned and thus
ficticious claims would flood the courts).
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"impact rule,'.. "zone of danger rule,"2 and "physical manifestations
requirement,"22 have artificially limited both application and amount
of recovery. 3 The impact rule limits liability to those plaintiffs who
suffered direct physical harm as a result of the defendant's
negligence." However, the impact rule has eroded into a mere for-
mality, with any trivial impact serving as a basis for liability without
any consideration of the actual distress of the plaintiff.25 In bystander
cases, most courts have abandoned the impact rule in favor of the
"zone of danger" rule.2' Under this approach, if a plaintiff is in close
proximity to the defendant's negligent act and in apprehension of
physical impact, he may recover for the physical harm resulting from
fright caused by the near miss." Under both the impact and zone of
danger rules, recovery for emotional distress is not allowed unless
20. The impact rule requires a blow or impact as a condition for recovering
damages in negligent infliction of emotional distress actions. The impact rule was
established in the landmark case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896). In Mitchell, a horse drawn carriage stopped just before striking the
plaintiff. The plaintiff fainted and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. Recovery was
denied because there was no physical impact.
21. The zone of danger rule was established in Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128
Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941). In Orlo, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle following
the defendant's trolley. The trolley struck trolley wires, causing the wires to snap
and fall upon the vehicle in which the plaintiff was seated. The plaintiff remained
seated in the vehicle while the wires flashed and hissed about. The plaintiff allegedly
suffered nervous shock as well as aggravation to pre-existing physical ailments. The
court allowed recovery because the plaintiff was within such close proximity to the
accident that there was substantial risk of physical injury.
22. See infra note 29.
23. Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander
and Direct Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 145, 146 (1984).
24. See, e.g., Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N.J.L. 277, 36 A.
100 (1896) (physical and mental injury must occur together); Gillium v. Stewart, 291
So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974) (recovery denied because of the absence of an impact where
defendant's automobile crashed into plaintiffs house, causing the plaintiff to experience
severe chest pains and require immediate hospitalization).
25. Christy Brothers Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928)
(impact found where horse excreted in plaintiffs lap).
26. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 110 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1961); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Falzone v. Busch, 45
N.J. 559, 214 A.2d (1970); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 434, 210 A.2d 709
(1965); see also Comment, Negligence-Infliction of Emotional Harm-A Suggested Analysis,
54 IOWA L. REV. 914 (1969). A few jurisdictions still retain the impact rule. See, e.g.,
Kroger Co. v. Beck, 378 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. App. 1978) (impact rule remains except where
defendant's conduct is intentional and likely to cause emotional harm); Strickland v.
Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 904, 216 S.E.2d 706 (1975).
27. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has adopted the zone of danger ap-
proach. There is "no liability for illness or bodily harm to another which is caused
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accompanied by physical manifestations of the emotional distress. 8 In-
dividuals who suffered psychological harm resulting from emotional
distress such as fright, humiliation, panic, and so forth, were denied
recovery because their symptoms were not visible.'
by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the
negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to the other." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 313(2) (1965). See, e.g., Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
28. The physical manifestation requirement was developed to balance the plain-
tiffs interest in freedom from emotional distress and the courts interest in eliminating
both fraudulent claims and the possibility of unlimited liability. The physical manifesta-
tion requirement was viewed as a means of assuring adequate proof of the genuineness
of the claim. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case For an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1239 (1971). The Restatement exemplifies the courts'
reluctance to allow recovery for purely emotional or mental harm without accompany-
ing physical manifestations in negligent infliction actions. The Restatement adheres
to the following approach: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results
in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other comparable damage,
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS S 436A (1965). See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 310 S.E.2d 145 (1947)
(in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, recovery is not permitted for emo-
tional distress by itself; the emotional disturbance must be accompanied by a physical
injury).
29. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for emotional
distress itself, and recovery was always limited to the physical manifestations of emo-
tional distress. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del. 1965) (recovery
limited to physical manifestations of emotional distress, not emotional distress itself).
Although it is generally recognized that fright is accompanied by specific physical
injuries susceptible to medical diagnosis, courts seem to require that the plaintiff suf-
fer traumatic neurosis, a more visible form of physical injury, before allowing recovery.
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an Independent Tort, 59
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1239 (1971). Most courts denied recovery in cases of "fright" or "shock"
apparently on the theory that nervous shock alone inflicts no lasting harm to a nor-
mal person, regardless of its severity. Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock,
19 MOD. L. REV. 478, 482 (1956) (the consensus of modern medical opinion is that
lasting damage does not occur in normal individuals as a result of emotional shock,
however severe). Recovery for "emotional" distress under the physical manifestation
requirement is largely dependent on the existence and proof of "physical" injuries.
See, e.g., Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945)
(no recovery for psychic injury due to nervous shock when no substantial physical
injury is claimed). Under the physical manifestation rule, where recovery is limited
to physical injuries resulting from emotional distress, the emotional distress itself is
viewed as merely a causative agent, unworthy of compensation. See Comment, Rickey
v. Chicago Transit Authority: Consistent Limitations on Recovery for Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress in Illinois, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 563 (1984) (the physical in-
jury requirement is not merely an evidentiary hurdle, satisfaction of which opens the
door to recovery for emotional distress itself). If the true concern is redressing the
negligent infliction of emotional distress, it seems illogical for courts to require that
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Several jurisdictions have expressed dissatisfaction with the ar-
tificiality and harshness of the physical manifestations requirement."
Medical research indicates that emotional and physical injury are not
separate and distinct types of harm; they are interrelated. 1 It is
medically impossible to differentiate between a physical and purely
emotional injury for purposes of satisfying the physical manifestations
requirement.3" Some courts have recognized that continued adherence
to the physical manifestations requirement is arbitrary in light of con-
temporary medical knowledge in the area of emotional harm." The
physical manifestations requirement has been replaced in some
jurisdictions by an objective standard that allows jurors to consider
the surrounding circumstances of the case in assessing the validity
of the plaintiff's claim." However, the vast majority of states still
employ the physical manifestations requirement as a device to avoid
the issue of emotional harm.
plaintiffs suffer anything other than emotional distress. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders
for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules,
34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 510 (1982) (in negligent infliction cases, the harm that con-
cerns the law is emotional, it is illogical to require that the plaintiff suffer a physical
injury). Yet, courts continue to require physical manifestations to limit the scope of
liability for emotional distress and to provide them with something "tangible" on which
to justify damages. Comment, The Common Law Treatment in Wisconsin of the Right
to Recover for Emotional Harm, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1977).
30. Hawaii, Maine, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, California, and Iowa have also
abandoned the physical manifestation requirement. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii
398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plant, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me.
1970; D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Branhill v. Davis,
300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
31. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237, 1253 (1971).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982)
(rejected the physical manifestations requirement because it encourages extravagant
pleading and distorted testimony to demonstrate such manifestations).
The Molien court stated: "the attempted distinction between physical and
psychological injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof,
whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn
on this artificial and often arbitrary classification scheme." Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at
821, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
34. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970), in which the
Hawaii Supreme Court adopted an objective standard for emotional distress claims:
"serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by the circum-
stances of the case." Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. In adopting this standard, the court
relied on Dean Prosser's "guarantee of genuineness" test. Prosser developed the guarantee
of genuineness for negligent transmission of death notices and corpse mishandling cases:
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Significant advances have been made by medical science in the
area of emotional injuries since the inception of the physical manifesta-
tions requirement. 5 With the development of psychiatric tests and
diagnostic techniques, medical science is able to establish the existence,
seriousness and consequences of emotional harm with reasonable cer-
tainty.' Medical experts recognize that emotional injury and physical
injury are not separate and distinct types of harm; the two are in-
tertwined. 7 Every emotional injury has a physical aspect and physical
injury has an emotional aspect.'
Due to increasing medical proof that all emotional disturbance
is accompanied by physical manifestations, courts adhering to the
physical injury rule restrict recovery to long term emotional distress
evidenced by visible physical symptoms. 9 Medical science generally
recognizes two types of mental or emotional reactions to trauma:
primary and secondary responses." The body's initial reaction to
traumatic stimuli,4 ' the primary reaction, is an immediate, automatic
response which causes the body to undergo short term physiological
changes, such as increased muscle tension, increased tendon reflexes,
[There] is an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress
arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that
the claim is not spurious. There may perhaps be other such cases. Where
the guarantee can be found, and the mental distress is undoubtedly real
and serious, there is no essential reason to deny recovery.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 330 (4th ed. 1971).
35. Ferrarra v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958)
(in judging the validity of a claim for emotional harm, courts and juries may rely on
the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession).
36. Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerg-
ing from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 604 (1982).
37. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1253 (1971).
38. Id.
39. Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerg-
ing From Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982) (severe depression, suicidal tendencies,
nightmares, sleeplessness, and neurotic fears are some of the emotional disorders courts
have identified as sufficiently serious to warrant compensation).
40. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1249-60 (1971).
41. In general medical terminology "trauma" refers to body tissue damage
from external force: a black eye, a surgical incision, a fractured bone, a gunshot wound.
Psychiatry adapted this word to denote damage to the mental and emotional life of
humans affected by external events and speaks of "psychic trauma": a child loses its
mother; an adolescent girl is raped. Also, certain kinds of accidents can be psycholog-
ically traumatic. Modlin, Psychiatric Reactions to Accidents, S 20.1 LAWYERS MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA (3d ed. 1983).
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pupil dilation, overbreathing, sweating and the like." This reaction
protects the individual from possible physical harm and stress aroused
by fear for one's safety or by witnessing the painful death of a loved
one. 3 Symptoms of the primary reaction are relatively short in dura-
tion and vary according to the intensity of the trauma and the in-
dividual." Pre-impact terror, because it is brief in duration, is a
primary reaction to stress. Generally, plaintiffs who suffer primary
reactions to emotional distress are unable to satisfy the physical
manifestations requirement because their accompanying physical in-
juries are frequently transient and concealed."5
Conversely, emotional distress in the form of a secondary
reaction" or "traumatic neurosis"" is a psychological disorder stem-
ming from an individual's long term inability to adjust to a traumatic
42. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 501, 472 P.2d 758, 761 (1974) (the primary
response is an instinctive response that protects individuals from the unpleasantness
of exposure to trauma, and is exemplified by emotional responses such as fear, anger,
and shock). See also, Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an
Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1249 (1971).
43. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, The Case for an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1249-60 (1970).
44. Id. at 1250.
45. Id. at 1258.
46. Id. at 1249.
47. The term "traumatic neuroses," originated by the medical profession, came
to prominence during World War I as an explanatory label for a variety of unusual
psychiatric syndromes not ordinarily seen in civilian practice. The phrase is not ac-
cepted in official lists of psychiatric diagnostic nomenclature because it proved inex-
act and misleading. However, it lingers in medical literature as jargon, and has become
firmly entrenched in legal terminology. Lack of consensus among medical writers re-
garding what the term denotes and connotes aggravates the confusion. See supra note
41; see also Comment, Neurosis Following Trauma: A Dark Horse in the Field of Mental
Disturbance, 8 CUM. L. REV. 495 (1977). The term "traumatic neurosis" has largely
been replaced by the term "neurosis following trauma." Id. at 497. The neurosis is
a psychological reaction triggered by a traumatic incident. Id. at 497-98. Neurosis follow-
ing trauma has two stages. The initial stage, traumatic syndrome, emerges shortly
after the traumatic incident and lasts anywhere from a few days to several months.
The symptoms include nightmares, headaches, dizziness, insomnia, blackouts, anxiety,
loss of sexual drive, etc. The second stage develops if the individual cannot regain
psychic equilibrium after the traumatic syndrome. The neurosis may surface as one
of many neurotic conditions, such as (1) chronic brain syndrome; (2) post-concussion
syndrome; (3) anxiety state; (4) hysteria; (5) psychosomatic reaction; (6) psychosis. All
of these disorders are indefinite in length. Id. at 498; see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS S 308.30, 309.81
(3d ed. 1980); Laughlin, Neuroses Following Trauma, in TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND
SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 76 (P. Cantor ed. 1962). The terms traumatic neurosis and
secondary response are used interchangeably.
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event. Secondary responses are extended in duration and are usually
accompanied by visible physical symptoms. 8 Expert medical testimony
is especially appropriate in such cases because a psychiatrist can
evaluate and document the causal relationship between the negligent
act and the plaintiffs asserted injury.49
PRECEDENT FOR PRE-IMPACT DAMAGES
Courts have allowed recovery for the fear of impending death
in situations other than airplane crashes. The earliest case where
damages were awarded based upon a decedent's realization of impend-
ing death is Meehan v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J.' In Meehan, the dece-
dent was a passenger on a train which derailed at a speed of forty
miles per hour and fell over the edge of an open drawbridge into
a river, causing the passenger's death by drowning.5 ' The court
awarded recovery for the decedent's fear of impending death from
the time the train began its descent until the moment of impact with
the water below. 5'2 The result was predicated upon the drawing of
a reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence as to what most
likely occurred on the train prior to impact.'
Similarly, pre-impact damages have been awarded for a dece-
dent's fear of being struck by a falling object' as well as terror ex-
perienced during a brief interval between the time a decedent fell
and subsequent impact with the ground below. In Kozar v. Chesapeake
and Ohio R.R. Co., a suit brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the foreman of a wrecking crew was instantly killed
in an attempt to rerail a boxcar.' The boxcar, which was suspended
48. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, The Case for an Indepen-
dent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1260-61 (1971).
49. Id.
50. 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
51. Id.
52. Id. The Meehan court addressed the issue of speculation as to the dece-
dent's fear of death. The court stated:
Circumstantial evidence is not to be disregarded. The jury has assessed
a value of $10,000 [for the decedent's pain and suffering]. I cannot state
as a matter of law that this is excessive. The decedent was presumably
thrown around in the car prior to the precipitation of the car into the
river, and to his drowning.
Id. at 625.
53. L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 13.04 [6] (1985).
54. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
56. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. S.D.
1970).
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over the tracks, began to fall while the decedent was underneath it."
The decedent was aware of impending danger, as evidenced by
witnesses who testified that the decedent attempted to escape the
falling boxcar in a bent over position to avoid being struck.' The court
affirmed a $500 award for the decedent's pre-impact terror.5 In the
case of Hinson v. SS Paros,1 the court awarded pre-impact pain and
suffering damages to the estate of a longshoreman who placed his
hand on the chain of a port rail which gave way causing him to fall
overboard."1 The court upheld the jury verdict of $5000 for the dece-
dent's pre-impact pain and suffering despite the fact that only a few
seconds elapsed between the time he fell and the time he struck the
water below. 2 The facts of these cases suggest that the decedents
were at least briefly aware of their impending death and these cases
are, therefore, applicable to most airplane crashes.
The first case addressing the issue of the availability of pre-
impact damages arising out of a major air disaster was Feldman v.
Allegheny Airlines.' In Feldman, the plaintiff presented evidence that
the passengers died from asphyxiation rather than impact, and that
many of them were clustered around a door of the plane that they
were unable to open." The plaintiff also proffered testimony from a
survivor who anticipated the crash when he observed through the
plane window that the plane was at an unusually low altitude."
Arguably, such evidence reasonably supports an inference that the
passengers suffered mental anguish associated with the realization of
impending death. Yet, the court denied pre-impact damages, holding
that the passengers' alleged pre-impact pain and suffering was "too
57. Id. at 364.
58. "The jury certainly could have reasonably determined from this evidence
that [the decedent] sustained emotional injuries caused by a terrifying realization that
he was about to die." Id. at 366.
59. Id. at 364, 366.
60. Hinson v. S.S. Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 222.
63. 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974) afj'd in part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d. Cir. 1975).
The Feldman case arose out of the crash of an airliner near New Haven Connecticut.
In support of his claim for pre-impact conscious pain and suffering prior to death,
the plaintiff submitted a National Traffic Safety Board Report that indicated that an
intense fire began upon impact. The report also indicated that the accident was deemed
survivable. Id. at 1300-01.
64. Id.
65. Id.
19861
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speculative" in light of the fact that the aircraft's "attitude" under-
went no dramatic change indicative of disaster."
The Fifth Circuit was the first jurisdiction to allow recovery for
pre-impact pain and suffering in anticipation of imminent death aris-
ing from an airplane crash.67 In Solomon v. Warren," the decedents
were passengers in a rented airplane on a trip to the Carribean
Islands. 9 While over open water, the pilot communicated with Air
Traffic Control and advised them that the plane was nearly out of
fuel and that he was going to attempt to ditch the aircraft near a
merchant vessel." This was the last communication from the plane
and despite an extensive search of the area, no traces of the aircraft
or its occupants were ever found.7' There was admittedly no evidence
as to the length of time the decedents suffered before death or
whether they died immediately upon impact. 2 Nonetheless, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that "both of the deceas-
ed knew of the impending crash landing at sea, knew of the immediate
dangers involved, and are certain to have experienced the most ex-
cruciating type of pain and suffering....[t]he knowledge that one is
about to die, leaving three cherished children alone."73 The court con-
cluded that proof of the decedents' mental anguish could reasonably
be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the plane's disap-
pearance.74
The court applied Florida law in resolving the issue of damages
for the decedents' mental pain and suffering prior to death. 5 Under
Florida law, in order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
66. Id. "Attitude" refers to whether the nose of the aircraft is up or down
or whether the wings are level or banked. See Kennelly, Litigation Implications of
the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American Airlines Flight 191, 15 J. MAR. L. REV.
273 (1982).
67. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. S 761, et
seq. (1970)). For an extensive discussion of Solomon, see Comment, Damages-Recovery
Allowed for Pain and Suffering Experienced by Decedent, 4 W. ST. L. REV. 301 (1976-77).
68. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 777.
69. Id. at 781.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 792.
73. Id.
74. The inference is reasonable, almost compelling, that the decedents were
aware of the probability of their impending deaths from the time the pilot communicated
with Air Traffic Control. Id.
75. Id. at 777. Plaintiffs brought an action for decedent's pain and suffering
pursuant to the Florida Survival Statute, FLA. STAT. S 46.021 (1971).
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distress, the plaintiff had to satisfy the "impact rule.""6 The Solomon
court employed a novel approach in applying the impact rule: it revers-
ed the usual sequence of impact followed by pain and suffering by
permitting recovery for pain and suffering preceding the impact." The
court found it illogical to deny a claim for pain and suffering simply
because the sequence was reversed."8 Thus, Solomon stood directly
for the proposition that a decedent's mental anguish between plane
malfunction and subsequent impact with the ground is compensable.
RECENT PRE-IMPACT CASES
New York Pre-Impact Cases
To date, the only case arising out of the American Airlines Flight
191 crash at Chicago's O'Hare Airport"9 where plaintiffs have been
76. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 793, n.21, citing Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (no recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical injury).
77. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 793.
78. Id. citing McLeod v. Young, 257 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(decedent experienced mental anguish while watching oncoming vehicle approach).
79. For a detailed discussion of the crash see Kennelly, Litigation Implica-
tions of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of American Airlines Flight 191, 15 J. MAR.
L. REv. 273 (1982); see also National Transportation Safety Board, Aircraft Accident
Report: American Airlines, Inc., D-C-10-10, NILOAA, Chicago-O'Hare International Air-
port, Chicago, Illinois, May 25, 1979 (1979). According to the NTSB report, th air-
craft's left engine fell off the aircraft during takeoff due to the failure of one of the
pylons. Kennelly, at 284. Pylons are the structures beneath the wings which support
and connect the engine to the main frame of the aircraft. Id. at 284, n.56. The left
engine and pylon assembly separated from the aircraft, went over the top of the left
wing and the fuselage, and fell to the side of the runway. Id. at 286. Despite the
loss of the left engine, the aircraft continued its takeoff and became airborne. Id. Dur-
ing an 18-second period after it became airborne, the aircraft maintained a relatively
stable attitude. Id. at 273, n.4. In other words, during the middle portion of
the flight, the aircraft did not tilt, sway back and forth, or go from side to side,
but continued to fly in a relatively stable condition. During this 18-second period, the
aircraft reached an altitude of approximately 325 feet. Id. at 286. Approximately 20
seconds after becoming airborne, the aircraft began to roll to the left. Id. at 287. It
continued to roll and turn to the left until the fuselage of the plane was horizontal.
Id. Five seconds later, the aircraft crashed. Id. at 287. Cases arising out of the Flight
191 crash were multi-districted (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1407) on the issue of liability
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 277.
Defendants American Airlines and McDonnell Douglas agreed not to dispute liability
for compensatory damages. Id. at 283. After discovery had been completed, the cases
were remanded back to the various federal district courts for a trial on compensatory
damages only. Id. For a discussion of the conflict of law problems associated with
Flight 191 crash litigation, see id. at 276-77.
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permitted to recover damages for a decedent's pre-impact pain and
suffering has been Shu Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.' The jury
awarded the plaintiff $10,000 for the decedent's pre-impact pain and
suffering." The case was tried in the Southern District of New York
on the issue of damages, and therefore the court applied New York
law regarding the negligent infliction of emotional distress.2
Initially, the Lin court examined whether New York law
recognizes a cause of action for pre-impact pain and suffering damages
resulting from the decedent's knowledge of impending death. New
York tort principles permit recovery for emotional distress if a plain-
tiff is made to fear for his own safety.' More importantly, recovery
for emotional distress is allowed even though no physical injuries or
"manifestations" occur. Since New York law previously recognized
an action for pre-death pain and suffering after an injury that subse-
quently leads to death, the court had no difficulty extending recovery
to include damages for a decedent's mental pain and suffering before
impact." The Lin court found it illogical to deny recovery for fear
experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured but
aware of imminent death. 7 In short, the plaintiff in Lin was entitled
to maintain an action for pre-impact emotional distress without being
required to plead or prove any physical injuries or "manifestations"
resulting from the emotional distress.
Having decided that New York law would recognize a compen-
sable claim for pre-impact damages, the issue remained whether the
plaintiff could produce evidence from which the jury could properly
infer fear of impending death. In factual settings such as that in Lin,
80. 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 53.
82. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal court must apply
the substantive law of the state in which it sits).
83. Shu Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas, 574 F. Supp. 1407, 1416-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). The Second Circuit affirmed district court's ruling that New York law would
allow pre-impact recovery. 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 176 (1961)
(abandoned impact rule).
85. Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332 (1983).
86. Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1416-17. The Court stated:
In several cases, it has been held that a decedent's estate may recover
for a decedent's pain and suffering endured after the injury that led to
his death [citations omitted]. From this proposition, it is only a short step
to the allowing of damages for a decedent's pain and suffering before the
mortal blow and resulting from the apprehension of impending death.
Id. at 1416-17.
87. Id.
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where there are no eyewitnesses to testify as to what the decedent
may have experienced, the plaintiff must proffer a "chain of inferences"
to support his pre-impact claim.' In Lin, the only evidence that the
plaintiff presented to the jury was a seating chart of the aircraft and
a stipulation by the parties that the decedent had been assigned to
a window seat on the left side of the aircraft above the rear portion
of the wing. 9 From this seat, the decedent may reasonably have
observed the left engine and pylon assembly separate from the left
88. A "chain of inferences" is inference upon inference without the interven-
tion of positive proof of facts between the inferences. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 41
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Professor Wigmore rejected any rule that an inference
cannot be based on another inference to establish a fact at issue in a trial. "Single
inferences, though weak when taken individually, may be substantial and powerful
when added together." Id. The issue is not whether any particular inference in
a chain of inferences is too weak, but whether in light of all patterns of corroborating
and contradictory evidence, the fact to be proved has been shown to the degree of
certainty required by the applicable burden of proof. Id. In criticizing the rule set
forth by some courts that an inference may not be based on another inference, Pro-
fessor Wigmore gave the following illustration:
For example, on a charge of murder the defendant's gun is found dis-
charged. From this we infer that he discharged it and from this we infer
that it was his bullet that struck and killed the deceased. Or the defen-
dant is shown to have been sharpening a knife. From this we argue that
he had a design to use it upon the deceased, and from this we argue
that the fatal stab was the result of this design. In these and innumerable
daily instances we build up inference upon inference, and yet no court
(until in very modern times) ever thought of forbidding it. All depart-
ments of reasoning, all scientific work, every day's life and every day's
trials proceed upon such data.
Id. Wigmore also approved of the approach taken in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
McNeely, 5 Ariz. 181, 79 P.2d 948, 953 (1938). The McNeely court observed that
in everyday life we frequently act as a result of the repeated piling of inferences
upon inferences. Id. at 954. The court held that the true meaning of the inference
upon inference rule in civil cases is that it is permissible to draw successive inferences
to be used as links in the chain of inferences, provided each prior inference is established
to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory. Id. at 955. A number of courts have
adopted an approach similar to that found in McNeely. See, e.g., Carnevale v. Smith,
122 R.I. 1218, 404 A.2d 836, 840-41 (1979) (if a plaintiff intends to meet the burden
of proof by relying on a chain of inferences, the ultimate inference drawn by the fact-
finder is allowed only if the first or prior inference has been established to the exclu-
sion of other reasonable inferences). In many cases, the courts have held or at least
stated that an inference cannot be based on another inference. See, e.g., United States
v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 284 (1875) (whenever circumstantial evidence is relied on to prove
a fact, the circumstances must be proved by testimonial evidence, and not inferred
from circumstantial evidence) See also Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 100 (1966) (extensive collec-
tion of authority, the cases indicate that courts frequently disagree about whether
the rule prohibiting chains of inferences should prevail).
89. Lin, 574 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
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wing. He also may reasonably have been aware of the aircraft's plight
from the ensuing roll into a steep left bank." In order to establish
the decedent's awareness of impending death, the plaintiff had to rely
on the following chain of inferences:" (1) the decedent was actually
sitting in his assigned seat despite the fact that it is common for
passengers to sit in other seats; (2) the decedent was awake and alert;
(3) the decedent was looking out the window and saw the engine detach
from the wing; (4) the size of the window was large enough to see
the loss of an engine and portions of the wing; (5) the path followed
by the falling engine as it went over the top of the wing enabled
the decedent to view the engine; (6) the decedent would realize the
aircraft's predicament, namely, that it could not fly without the engine;
(7) that this realization would have frightened the decedent; (8) that
the decedent was aware of impending disaster long enough to cause
mental anguish. The Second Circuit found such inferences to be plausi-
ble in upholding the jury's pre-impact pain and suffering award.2
In Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,93 a companion case to Lin,
the Second Circuit held that speculation as to pre-impact mental
anguish should not be substituted for proof. The court reversed an
$87,000 pre-impact award, finding no evidence that the decedent was
awake, nor aware that anything was wrong. The court held that it
would be purely conjectural to infer that a passenger seated on the
right side of the aircraft knew of the impending disaster." Insofar
as the plaintiff's claim that pre-impact mental anguish could be pre-
sumed from the rolling of the plane, the court observed that aircraft
90. The district court stated:
[Gliven that [the decedent] was assigned to a window seat on the plane's
left side, and given the reasonable inference that he was in his seat...the
jury might reasonably have inferred that [the decedent] saw the engine
and other pieces break away from the plane. Even if he did not see the
damage, the jury might still have reasonably inferred that the sudden
change in the plane's attitude...notified [the decedent] of the impending
disaster . ..
574 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
91. Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 2, col. 4.
92. Lin, 742 F.2d at 53.
93. 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
94. The court noted that there was no evidence that the pilot or any of the
passengers called the danger to the passengers' attention. Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206.
"As far as the record is concerned [the decedent] could have dozed off in his seat."
Id. at 207.
95. "[Ilt would be sheer speculation to infer that he knew of the incident."
Id. at 206.
96. Id. at 207.
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frequently roll and bank in compliance with normal airline traffic pat-
terns. 7 The court concluded that because the roll did not develop in-
to a 90-degree left plunge until only three seconds before impact, there
was insufficient time for a passenger to recognize and react to the
plane's predicament." Shatkin firmly established that the requirements
of proof of both awareness of impending death and appreciation of
mental anguish would not be replaced by impermissible speculation.
Illinois Pre-Impact Cases
In contrast to the Lin decision, plaintiffs in cases arising out
of the Flight 191 crash filed in the Northern District of Illinois have
been unable to recover pre-impact damages.99 Plaintiffs seeking pre-
impact damages were confronted by what appears to be an insur-
mountable obstacle; they were required to allege and prove "physical
manifestations" of the passengers' emotional distress." Whether plain-
tiffs will be able to furnish sufficient evidence of the passengers'
physical manifestations to obtain a verdict and have it upheld remains
to be seen.''
While the Northern District of Illinois recognized a cause of ac-
tion for pre-impact pain and suffering under Illinois law, the court
held that the plaintiffs were required to prove pre-impact emotional
distress and physical manifestations resulting from the distress. Ill-
inois recently abandoned the impact rule in favor of the zone of danger
rule for negligently inflicted emotional distress."2' Under this new rule,
plaintiffs must allege and prove physical injuries or illness resulting
from emotional distress. 1 3 An Illinois appellate" court and the North-
97. Id. at 206-07.
98. Id.
99. Seigel, Plaintiffs Recover for Mental Suffering Prior to Death, 19 TRIAL
6 (1983).
100. The plaintiffs committee on pain and suffering for nind suits arising out
of the Flight 191 crash argued that it could show physical manifestations such as in-
creased heart rate, sweating, pupil dilation, bladder and bowel incontinence, muscular
tremors, increased respiration, restriction of coronary arteries, hyperirritability of the
nervous system and shock. Kaberon, Pre-Impact Distress at Issue in DC-10 Trial, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., May 18, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
101. Id. at 1, col. 4 and at 20, col. 1.
102. In Re Air Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, No. MDL-391,
slip op. (N.D. Ill. E.D. Sept. 10, 1984). Suits arising out of the Flight 191 crash were
consolidated for discovery and pre-trial purposes before Judges Robson and Will. The
court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages for alleged pre-
impact pain and suffering.
103. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
104. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 I1. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984).
1986]
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ern District of Illinois 0 5 have interpreted Illinois law to mean that
once physical manifestations are established, plaintiffs may recover
for both emotional distress and the accompanying physical injury. The
Northern District of Illinois inferentially suggested that proving
physical manifestations of the passenger's pre-impact fright was highly
unlikely, but nevertheless allowed plaintiffs to pursue a cause of ac-
tion for such damages.0 6
In Moruzi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 7 the plaintiff sought to
satisfy the physical manifestations requirement through expert
testimony that passengers aboard Flight 191 suffered increased heart
rate, increased breathing rate, pupil dilation, sweating, and so forth."8
105. DeYoung v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 79 C 2790 (N.D. Ill. E.D. June
12, 1985) (available in WESTLAW, Allfeds database). In DeYoung, the court held that
plaintiff would be allowed to recover for the internal operation of fright or other emo-
tional disturbance upon proof of physical manifestations. In a footnote, the court cited
Judge Will's Memorandum Opinion in In Re Air Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on
May 25, 1979, No. MDL-391, slip op. (N.D. Ill. E.D. September 15, 1983), where the
court concluded that the effect of Rickey is to permit recovery for pre-impact pain
and suffering by plaintiffs who can show physical manifestations. "IT]here is nothing
in Rickey to suggest that, assuming the physical manifestations are established, emo-
tional distress and the resultant physical manifestations are not both compensable."
Id. at 10-11.
106. In Re Air Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, No. MDL-391,
slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ill. E.D. Dec. 13, 1983) ("each of the plaintiffs, obviously is faced
with a difficult task to show that, in the period of seconds before the crash, the
decedent in fact suffered physical manifestations or injury as a result of pre-impact
fright").
107. Moruzi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No 79 C 4805 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1984)
(Will, J.).
108. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Supplemental Motion in Limine
to Bar Testimony of Plaintiffs Expert Witness, Moruzi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
No. 79 C 4805 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1984). The plaintiff's psychiatric witness used the
principles of Seyle's General Adaptation Syndrome theory to describe the passenger's
reaction to the impending crash. The General Adaptation Syndrome (G.A.S.) was
developed by Dr. Hans Seyle. He is regarded by experts as the father of modern
stress theory. Dr. Seyle defined stress as the nonspecific response of the body to any
demand upon it. The basic definitions of the General Adaptation Syndrome are as
follows:
a. Nonspecific response-one that affects all or most parts of a system
without selectivity.
b. The agent's placing demands on the body are called "stressors," which
may be beneficial or harmful in nature depending on the individual, the
situation and intensity of the stressors.
Dr. Seyle suggested that certain hormones, called "adaptive" hormones are released
during stress, and that these hormones help to create the common symptoms seen
in all patients. The stressors that may bring about the G.A.S. may be trauma, infec-
tion, burns, emotional upset, or other common events. The stages of G.A.S. are as
follows:
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In the pre-trial proceedings, defendants moved to dismiss on the
availability of damages for pre-impact pain and suffering.' 9 Their mo-
tion was based on the contention that Illinois law only permits
recovery for injury or illness resulting from emotional distress, not
normal or predictable anxiety reactions.'0 The court denied the motion
and permitted the plaintiff to submit his pre-impact claim to the jury."'
(1) Alarm Reaction-the body shows the characteristics of the first ex-
posure to a stressor. At the same time, the body's resistance is dimin-
ished and if the stressor is sufficiently strong, death may result.
(2) State of Resistance-resistance ensues if continual exposure to the
stressor is compatible with adaptation. The bodily signs of the alarm reac-
tion have virtually disappeared, and resistance rises above normal.
(3) State of Exhaustion- following long continual exposure to the same
stressor, to which the body has become adjusted, eventually adaptation
of energy is exhausted.
H. SEYLE, THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF EXPOSURE TO STRESS (1950); see also H.
SEYLE, STRESS WITHOUT DISTRESS (1974). In Moruzi, the plaintiff's psychiatric expert
testified that the passengers passed through the first two stages of the G.A.S. because
they experienced emotional distress and there would be an immediate attempt by the
body to adapt. He testified that it is a reasonable assumption that the passengers
had a profound stress experience during those thirty seconds aboard the aircraft. Plain-
tiffs expert also testified that stress itself is an "injury." He noted that the experience
of the stress syndrome creates certain biological abnormalities of an immediate nature
which an individual can experience subjectively, such as changes in the heart rate,
perspiration, a sense of fear, agitation, and verbalization. When exposed to this type
of "stressor," certain individuals feel a need to try to escape, to run and hide while
others experience "freezing" and immobility.
109. Memorandum of Defendant in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, Moruzi
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 79 C 4805 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1984) (plaintiff cannot
recover for the normal physiological reactions to fear, e.g., nausea, increased heart
rate, perspiration, but only for physical injuries or illness).
110. Id.
111. The following is an excerpt from Judge Will's instructions to the jury
in Moruzi:
First, you have to determine that [the decedent] did suffer some physical
injury, illness, or other physical manifestation as a result of fright, ter-
ror, mental anguish, or emotional distress, and then you are going to have
to determine, if [decedent] did, what damages will compensate her for
her pain and suffering for that 31-second period. You are going to have
to decide whether there was any injury or any illness or any physical
manifestations .... resulting from fright, terror, mental anguish, or emo-
tional distress ...because we have no evidence of physical injury, ill-
ness, or other physical manifestations from what may have happened to
[decedent] or other passengers being bumped around the airplane-that's
not an issue-we are not going to try to compensate [decedent] for
something we don't know. She may very well have been bruised or banged
up or what have you, had broken bones or something else, but that's not
relevant. We are talking about physical injury, illness, or distress, or other
physical manifestations resulting from terror, fright, mental anguish, or
emotional distress during that 31 seconds.
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Despite the compelling inference 1 '2 that passengers aboard Flight 191
experienced at least a few seconds of severe emotional distress prior
to impact, the jury awarded no pre-impact damages."3 Proving physical
manifestations of the passengers' mental anguish is virtually imposs-
ible in view of the brevity of the flight and the unavailability of
eyewitness testimony.'
Texas Pre-Impact Cases
Texas is the leading jurisdiction in the area of pre-impact pain
and suffering recovery. In addition to a statute allowing a separate
action for a decedent's damages prior to death, Texas tort law
recognizes the principle that mental pain and suffering can be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances." 5 For instance, pre-impact
damages have been awarded where a decedent watched with horror
as the negligent driver of a vehicle was about to run over him."' In
Green v. Hale, the court permitted recovery for the pre-impact pain
and suffering of a thirteen-year-old boy who fell underneath a pickup
truck moments before the truck began to back up."7 The court
112. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
113. Telephone interview with Terrence J. Lavin, attorney with the law firm
of Corboy & Demetrio, P.C., which represented the plaintiff in Moruzi.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
115. The Texas survival statute has the following provisions:
All causes of action upon which suit has been or may hereafter be brought
for personal injuries, or for injuries resulting in death, whether such in-
juries be to the health or to the reputation, or to the person of the in-
jured party, shall not abate by reason of the death of the person against
whom such cause of action shall have accrued, nor by reason of the death
of such injured person ....
TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958).
Awards for pre-impact pain and suffering do not require a very radical extension
of Texas tort law because the principle that pain and suffering can be inferred from the
circumstances has existed in Texas since 1885. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Curry, 64 Tex. 85
(1885). Broder, On Borrowed Time, in PERSONAL INJURY DESKBOOK 1984 at 421 (1984). See
also City of Austin v. Selter, 415 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). In City of Austin,
plaintiffs recovered $10,000 for the mental anguish experienced by their son in the
moments before he drowned. In upholding the award, the court held that direct proof of
the decedent's mental anguish was not necessary because the law does not require such proof
on matters of universal knowledge. Id. at 501 (citing Texas & P. Ry. Co.). The court stated:
A boy of [decedent's] age and intelligence certainly realized the hope-
lessness of the predicament that he was in and in the several minutes that
he struggled against an inevitability, that must have become apparent
to him, a reasonable inference of suffering and mental anguish could have
been drawn by the jury.
Id. at 502.
116. Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
117. Id. (The $5,000 award for decedent's pre-impact pain and suffering was
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acknowledged that the decedent's mental anguish was brief in dura-
tion, but held that the jury could draw a reasonable inference of ter-
ror and distress from the surrounding circumstances." 8
Similarly, a Texas appellate court affirmed a jury verdict for pre-
impact pain and suffering arising out of a mid-air collision despite the
fact that impact with the ground and subsequent death occurred
almost instantaneously."9 In Hurst Aviation v. Junell,'20 a small pro-
peller aircraft piloted by the decedent was hit from behind by another
aircraft. The tail of the decedent's aircraft was severed and fell off.'1
2
The collision occurred just sixty feet above the ground and decedent's
aircraft fell "like a rock" 2 to the ground.' 3 The jury found that the
reasonable value of the mental anguish sustained by the decedent
before his death was $20,000.12'4 Because there was only a two or three
second interval between the mid-air collision and impact with the
ground,' 2 it would have been impossible to show physical manifesta-
tions of the decedent's emotional distress. Yet, the court allowed
recovery because the decedent's mental anguish could be inferred from
proof that he was aware of impending death.'
In contrast to the transitory mental anguish in Hurst, there was
ample evidence from which a jury could infer that passengers endured
prolonged agony from the realization of impending death in the case
held not to be excessive).
118. Regardless of the brevity of suffering, a tremendous amount of fear can
be inferred from the circumstances. Id. at 238. "A [child] of [decedent's] age and in-
telligence would certainly realize the serious predicament he was in from the moment
he felt the backward movement of the truck ... and the inevitability of being crushed
• ..must have been apparent to him .. " Id.
119. 642 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App. 1982).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 858-59.
122. See infra text accompanying note 125.
123. Hurst, 642 S.W.2d at 858-59.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Notwithstanding the brevity of the decedent's mental anguish, a tremen-
dous amount of fear can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 859
(citing Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)). The court stated "the
evidence and inferences therefrom undeniably show that for a brief period of time
[decedent] realized his plight. Unable to control his craft, [decedent] suffered the hor-
ror of his impending doom as the plane plummeted to the earth." Id. Texas adheres
to the physical manifestations requirement. See, e.g., Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex.
641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953) (no recovery for emotional distress absent physical injuries);
Freedom Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Dickinson, 598 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App. 1980) (damages
for mental anguish cannot be recovered without accompanying physical injuries).
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of Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell. 2 In Yowell, a small aircraft was
flying at an altitude of ten thousand feet when portions of the air-
craft, including the tail and wings, began to separate from the air-
craft.s' There were at least thirty seconds between the first indica-
tions of peril and the first mid-air break-up, and a substantially longer
period of time during which the passengers were aware of their im-
minent doom as they fell from ten thousand feet to the ground." The
jury awarded $500,000 for each decedent's pre-impact mental anguish."
Louisiana Pre-Impact Cases
Federal courts applying Louisiana law have also been receptive
to claims for pre-impact pain and suffering. 3' In Haley v. Pan Am
World Airways, a case arising out of the Pan American Flight 759
127. 674 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). In Yowell, the plaintiffs sought
pre-impact damages under the Texas survival statute, see supra note 115. The
Fort Worth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that the pre-impact award
could not stand because the survival action had to be brought in the probate court
rather than in the district [trial] court. Id. at 456-59. The pre-impact award was also
reversed because the district court erred in allowing the plaintiffs to state a cause
of action for pre-impact damages on the last day of the trial, thereby interjecting an
entirely new theory of recovery which the defendants were unprepared to defend.
Id. at 459-60.
128. The aircraft was cruising at 11,000 feet when as a result of autopilot
malfunction, clear air turbulence, or both, the ends of the plane's horizontal tail could
not withstand the forces generated and bent in an upward direction causing the pilot
to lose control and a rapid descent of at least five thousand feet per minute from
eleven thousand feet to ten thousand feet. The pilot momentarily regained some con-
trol and was able to keep the plane at ten thousand feet until the damaged elevator
horns separated from the aircraft. This separation caused the tail to-flap and then
break off; when the tail broke off, the aircraft nosed over and continued in a dive
until the wings broke up; thereafter the fuselage in which the passengers were seated
continued its fall to the ground. The National Traffic Safety Board Report indicated
that at least three of the passengers were still in their seats when the fuselage hit
the ground, and their seat belts had to be cut to remove them. The report also in-
dicated that after the pilot realized that the tail had broken off, he shut off the fuel
due to the emergency situation. The pilot was conscious at that point, and there was
no evidence to refute the inference that the passengers were not also conscious of
the emergency situation. Siegel, Plaintiffs Recover for Mental Suffering Prior to Death,
19 TRIAL 6 (1983). Mr. Tom H. Davis, former American Trial Lawyer's Association
president and counsel for four plaintiffs in the Yowell case stated that proof of the
passengers physical manifestations was unnecessary. "The jury could conclude from
the facts in the case that the passengers suffered mental anguish. It was sufficient
just to show that the plane broke apart at 11,000 feet and the the passengers were
aware of something going wrong." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
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crash in Kenner, Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that family survivors were entitled to recover for the
decedent's pre-impact pain and suffering.'32 Although no Louisiana
court had ever confronted the issue of pre-impact pain and suffering,
the Haley court interpreted principles of Louisiana tort law to find
that fright or mental anguish is a separate element of damages ir-
respective of physical injury.' The court, relying upon its earlier
reasoning in Solomon, concluded that mental anguish is compensable
regardless of whether it occurs before or after impact.'"
The Haley case was similar to Lin and Solomon in that there
were no survivors to verify the decedent's asserted mental anguish
and no eyewitnesses to describe the plane's trajectory prior to the
crash. Testimony revealed that the plane took off and climbed to an
altitude of 163 feet before starting its final descent.' The plane rolled
to its left, struck a tree, and hit the ground some four to six seconds
later.'" The jury awarded $15,000 for the decedent's pre-impact pain
and suffering.'37 In sustaining the award, the court held that the jury
could have reasonably inferred that the passengers suffered mental
anguish at least from the time the plane's wing struck the tree.'8
Analysis of Louisiana, New York, Illinois, and Texas Cases
Several courts, recognizing that individuals have a right to
freedom from emotional disturbance, have been resourceful in inter-
preting statutes and precedent to allow recovery for pre-impact pain
and suffering.'" Due to the unavailability of eyewitness testimony and
the brief duration of the passenger's mental anguish, pre-impact pain
and suffering has proven to be a difficult element of damages for plain-
132. Id.
133. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code states in part: "Every act whatever
of man that causes damages to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to
repair it." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984). Dawson v. James H.
Stewart & Deaton, Inc., 437 So. 2d 974, 976 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (plaintiff compensated
for fright during ordeal); Steward v. Arkansas Southern Railway Co., 36 So. 676, 42
La. 764 (1904) (mental distress itself sufficient to award damages).
134. 746 F.2d at 315.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 315-16.
137. Id. at 317.
138. "One need not 'speculate' that the decedent was aware, for at least four
to six seconds, of the impending disaster. The jury could have reasonably inferred
therefrom that [the decedent] experienced the mental anguish commonly associated
with anticipation of one's own death." Id. at 317.
139. Broder, supra note 115, at 423.
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tiffs to deal with in the evidentiary context.40 Thus, in claims for pre-
impact pain and suffering arising out of air disasters, the courts have
held that evidence required to establish pain and suffering may be
circumstantial evidence, such as the erratic flight path of the plane."'
The common thread running through all the recent pre-impact
cases is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the dece-
dent was in position, and had sufficient time to perceive, recognize,
and react to the impending disaster.'42 The Second Circuit's decision
that in a common air disaster one passenger can be aware of an im-
minent crash and another unaware illustrates the emphasis courts have
placed upon proving that the individual passenger was indeed aware
of impending death.' In Lin, proof of the decedent's awareness of
impending death was satisfied by a seating assignment from which
a jury could reasonably infer that the decedent saw the left engine
and a portion of the wing break away from the aircraft. "
The Northern District of Illinois has allowed plaintiffs to state
a cause of action for pre-impact pain and suffering provided that
physical manifestations can be shown.4 5 It remains to be seen whether
plaintiffs can demonstrate enough physical manifestations to recover
pre-impact damages. 6 Texas and Louisiana law recognize the princ-
iple that direct evidence of pre-impact pain and suffering is unneces-
sary in factual situations where the surrounding circumstances ensure
the validity of the claim.'47 In aviation accident cases, where direct
proof of a decedent's fright and mental anguish is unavailable,'4 8 courts
applying Texas and Louisiana law allow the jury to infer pre-impact
terror from circumstantial evidence. 9 Courts applying Texas and Loui-
siana law limit their inquiry to the sufficiency of evidence regarding
the decedent's awareness of impending death.'-
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN PRE-IMPACT CASES
Although there is precedent for the recovery of pre-impact pain
and suffering awards, for the most part plaintiffs have not sought
140. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
141. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 88-138.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 99-114.
146. Kaberon, supra note 100.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 115-138.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 120-138.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 120-138.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 120-138.
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such damages in aviation accident cases. 5' The reasons appear to be
two-fold. First, pre-impact terror is difficult to establish because the
plaintiffs must rely on circumstantial evidence.'52 Second, pre-impact
terror is relatively short in duration, making it difficult for juries to
place a dollar value on the decedent's mental anguish."
In attempting to establish the existence of pre-impact mental
anguish, a plaintiff is confronted with serious problems of proof. In
ordinary personal injury actions, testimony from the one suffering pain
is available to prove pain and suffering. However, in pre-impact air
disaster cases, where everyone aboard the aircraft dies immediately
upon impact or shortly thereafter, special evidentiary problems are
presented. In order to justify compensation for pre-impact pain and
suffering, it should be shown that the decedent was aware of impend-
ing death long enough to experience emotional distress."M Frequently,
there are no survivors in an air disaster and therefore no direct
evidence of the decedent's mental anguish.' 55 Thus, the plaintiff must
rely on a chain of inferences to support his claim for pre-impact
damages."
Speculative Nature of Pre-Impact Damages
Opponents of pre-impact recovery contend that an award of
damages for pre-impact pain and suffering is based upon an imper-
missible chain of inferences that requires the jury to speculate as to
the decedent's reaction.'57 The possibility of speculation as to pre-
impact terror is certainly present because one cannot know what the
151. Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 2, col. 3-5.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 13.0416], citing Gallagher
v. United States, 3 Avi. 17, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (the court inferentially suggested that
in a proper case proof of awareness of impending death would warrant an award for
pre-impact pain and suffering).
155. Direct evidence or testimonial evidence is evidence which, if believed,
resolves a matter in issue. Circumstantial evidence requires additional reasoning to
reach the proposition to which it is directed. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE S 185 (3d ed.
1984).
156. See supra note 88.
157. See Broder, supra note 115, at 419. Mr. Broder addressed the defense's
argument that pre-impact pain and suffering is too conjectural because it is estab-
lished through circumstantial evidence. He stated:
It is a cruel irony that some opponents of the award of [pre-impact]
damages have based their opposition on the ground that the proof of ter-
ror is circumstantial. There are several rejoinders. First, objective proof
of subjective states is always and necessarily circumstantial. We can never
observe how another person feels, but only how he behaves; we estimate
19861
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decedent's reaction was to impending death. It is possible that more
inferences must be drawn in order to award damages for pre-impact
pain and suffering than for any other form of tort damages. In a fac-
tual situation such as Lin or Solomon, where there can be no testimony
from the one suffering mental anguish and there are no eyewitnesses
as to what the decedent may have experienced, the problems of proof
and valuation are magnified beyond the usual levels reached in emo-
tional distress cases."" Courts must fashion evidentiary standards that
reflect the reality of an air disaster.59 Resolving the issue of whether
pre-impact pain and suffering is "too speculative" should depend on
whether the passenger was in position, and had sufficient time to
perceive and react to the impending disaster.'O
Although plaintiffs must rely on circumstantial evidence to
establish pre-impact terror, improper speculation and conjecture should
not be substituted for proof. The speculative nature of pre-impact ter-
ror demands that courts closely scrutinize the basis of an award for
pre-impact pain and suffering. The plaintiff must be required to pre-
sent evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer pre-impact
terror on the part of the decedent. For instance, in Air Florida, Inc.
v. Zondler, a pre-impact case arising out of the widely publicized crash
of a jetliner into the Potomac River, the plaintiff submitted testimony
of a survivor of the crash.' The survivor testified that he anticipated
danger because the plane was shaking and because he saw other
passengers "looking around" as if something was wrong.'62 The jury
his feelings by examining our own response to the situation. If a jury
can be permitted to infer intent or negligence ... why should it not be
allowed to infer terror? Second, since in the wrongful death case the in-
jured person's lips are, by definition, forever sealed, the law has general-
ly acknowledged a lower standard of proof and has been more receptive
to circumstantial evidence in providing both liability and damages. Third,
we detect an element of Catch-22 in the objection. The defense will ob-
ject that evidence of pre-impact terror is not trustworthy because it can-
not be brought directly before the jury like survivors' grief. Of course,
since survivors' grief damages are too blatant to be permitted by our
law, the gravaman of defendants' objection is not really that either form
of proof is infirm, but simply that they don't want to confront the issue
of emotional damages at all.
Id. at 425. Mr. Broder represented the plaintiffs in the pre-impact case of Shu Tao
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 80-92.
158. Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 2, col. 3-5.
159. Broder, supra note 115, at 425-26.
160. See supra note 154.
161. 683 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
162. Id. at 774.
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awarded no damages for the decedent's pre-impact terror." The court
refused to overturn the jury's finding because the survivor did not
directly observe the decedent's awareness of impending disaster and
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that decedent was in a position to
see that the plane was about to crash. '" Similarly, in O'Rourke v.
Eastern Airlines Inc., a pre-impact case arising out of the crash of
Eastern Flight 66, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to present
the testimony of a stewardess who survived the crash because she
never saw the decedent or the decedent's reaction prior to the crash.'65
While the conjectural nature of pre-impact pain and suffering
is a valid argument supporting remittitur 66 of such damages, there
is little justification for courts to presume that any claim for pre-impact
damages is per se too speculative.'67 The rule denying recovery of
speculative damages applies only to circumstances in which the fact
of damage itself is questionable. 6 ' The proper measure of damages
for pre-impact terror, as in any other claim for pain and suffering,
is left to the discretion of the jury. Plaintiffs should not be denied
recovery merely because there is uncertainty as to the extent of dece-
dent's mental anguish. 9 A court should intervene and reduce a pre-
impact verdict only when it is apparent that a jury has exceeded the
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 730 F.2d 842, 855 (2d Cir. 1984).
166. Remittitur may properly be used to remedy an excessive award of damages
made by a properly instructed jury if the award is attributable to passion or pre-
judice. See generally, 6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 1 59.08(7) (2d ed. 1985).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. See also Demario v. Eastern
Airlines Inc., No. 76-267 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1981) (decedent's awareness of im-
pending death too speculative).
168. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
562 (1931). The court stated: "The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain
damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages
which are definitely attributable to the wrong, and only uncertain in respect of their
amount," quoted in Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1940).
169. It is generally recognized by courts and commentators that the extent
of tort damages need not be proved with the same definiteness as the cause of the
injury. The Restatement (Second) embodies this principle by stating:
There is, however, no general requirement that the injured person should
prove with like definiteness the extent of harm that he has suffered as
a result of the tortfeasor's conduct. It is desirable that responsibility for
harm should not be imposed until it has been proven with reasonable
certainty that the harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the per-
son charged. It is desirable, also, that there be definiteness of proof of
the amount of damages as far as is reasonably possible. It is even more
desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived of substantial
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limits of reason. 7 ° A pre-impact defendant cannot be heard to com-
plain that the valuation of pre-impact terror is speculative when he
alone is responsible for the uncertainty of such damages. The inference
is more than reasonable that passengers suffer excruciating mental
anguish as an aircraft plummets to the earth. 7 ' On the other hand,
it is not advocated that all a plaintiff should do in order to recover
pre-impact damages is enter a court and prove that the decedent was
on the plane. But if plaintiff can indeed show that a decedent was
aware of impending death, he should be allowed to recover for pre-
impact pain and suffering. 7 '
Brevity of Pre-Impact and Suffering
As one might expect, pre-impact defendants have argued that
the interval of pre-impact pain and suffering is too short, as a matter
of law, to warrant recovery.'73 The typical pre-impact claim involves
only a few seconds of mental anguish.' Although the length of time
a person suffers is a relevant consideration in determining damages
for pain and suffering, the necessarily short duration of pre-impact
emotional distress does not preclude recovery for such distress.'
Recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering is an excellent illustra-
tion of the trend toward awarding damages for pain and suffering
measured in minutes and seconds. 7 '
compensation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty
the extent of harm he has suffered. Particularly is this true in situations
where there cannot be any real equivalence between the harm and com-
pensation in money, as in cases of emotional disturbance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 912 comment a (1979).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967) (an award
of $15,000 for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering arising out of an airplane crash
that occurred less than a minute after take-off was affirmed because it was not "shock-
ing"); Haley v. Pan Am World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (the court held
that the jury's $15,000 award for the decedent's pre-impact pain and suffering was
neither "shocking" or contrary to "right of reason").
171. See Haley, 746 F.2d 311.
172. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 102. In Re Air Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979, No. MDL-391 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 1983), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois specifically rejected the defendant's argument that pre-
impact emotional distress is too brief as a matter of law to allow recovery. Kaberon,
supra note 100, at 1, col. 3, 4.
174. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
175. In Re Air Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, No. MDL-391
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 1983) (the necessarily short duration of the passengers' pre-impact
emotional distress ought not to make that distress totally non-compensable as a matter
of law).
176. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 213 So. 2d 169 (La. Ct. App. 1968) ($2,000 award
for five minutes of pain and anguish prior to drowning); Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric
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Traditionally, courts have not imposed limitations on recovery
for pain and suffering.'77 In order to recover for pain and suffering,
it is usually sufficient to show that the decedent suffered for an "ap-
preciable period of time." '78 What constitutes an appreciable length
of time will vary according to the circumstances of each case.'79 In-
creasingly, courts are permitting awards for very brief periods of pain
and suffering.'8 ° For example, in a recent case, $35,000 was awarded
for two-and-one-half minutes of conscious pain and suffering prior to
death by drowning."8 ' The plaintiffs expert testified that the moments
immediately prior to drowning are a period of heightened awareness
and seem longer in duration to the person struggling for his life.'82
In a federal case brought under the Death on the High Seas Act,
the plaintiff sought pain and suffering damages for passengers who
died when their plane suddenly exploded and crashed into the sea. '13
In rejecting the defendant's contention that recovery for pain and suf-
fering was precluded because the passengers died instantaneously, the
court said: "The fact that death came in a matter of minutes, or even
less, does not necessarily preclude an award for conscious pain and
suffering."'84
Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ($1,000 award for one or two seconds
of pain and suffering and mental anguish when a decedent was crushed between a
tractor-trailer and an automobile); Wiggins v. Lane & Co., 298 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La.
1969) ($10,000 for approximately two seconds of suffering when a decedent was struck
by piling and fell 50 feet to his death).
177. See, e.g., Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492, 256 P.2d
603 (1953) ($20,000 for twenty minutes of pain not excessive).
178. See Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1980).
In interpreting St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 684
(1915), the Cook court stated: "[If a decedent remains conscious for 'an appreciable
period of time' after his injury, a jury can properly return an award based on the
decedent's pain and suffering." Cook, 626 F.2d at 751. The Cook court also stated that
it would not adopt a "stop watch" approach to the question of whether a decedent
remained conscious for the requisite time period after he was injured...that determination
depends on the facts of each individual case. Id. at 751.
179. Cook, 626 F.2d at 751.
180. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY
SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM
OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 5-178 (1984) (a report to the A.B.A
which has not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors
and does not constitute the policy of the A.B.A); see also Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d
907, 912 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) ($5,000 for two or three minutes of physical pain and
mental anguish suffered by a child before drowning).
181. See Cook, 626 F.2d at 746. The trial court reduced the jury award from
$100,000 to $35,000. Id. at 752.
182. Id.
183. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
184. Id. at 1006.
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The recent pre-impact cases arising out of aviation accidents af-
firm the principle that recovery will be permitted where the intens-
ity of the emotional distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it, regardless of its brevity. Cases
such as Hurst and Haley reflect judicial recognition that a tremen-
dous amount of mental pain and suffering can be compressed into a
few seconds of abject terror. 5
MEASUREMENT OF PRE-IMPACT PAIN AND SUFFERING
In aviation disaster cases in which there are no survivors, pre-
impact pain and suffering must be established through circumstantial
evidence." Physical evidence such as cockpit voice recorders can show
cockpit dialogue, on board noises, explosions and possibly the hysterical
voices of passengers in the background. The plaintiff may be able to
establish that the decedent was in a position to observe the crash
on a screen inside the aircraft. 8 ' In Moruzi, the plane was equipped
with a cockpit camera which provided passengers with a pilot's eye
of the take-off on a screen. 8' If there are survivors, they can testify
about cabin emergency lights illuminating, oxygen masks dropping
from overhead compartments, flashing "fasten seat belt" signs, and
other factors that may have alerted passengers to an impending
crash.89
The path and trajectory of an aircraft as well as the duration
of pre-impact terror can be established with reasonable certainty
through the flight recorder.' The flight recorder contains computer
data that provides precise information about the plane's course.'
Evidence that the plane pitched and rolled during the pre-crash flight
supports an inference that passengers underwent mental anguish prior
to impact.'92 If evidence from flight recorders and cockpit voice
recorders is unavailable, testimony concerning the path of the air-
craft may be provided by air traffic controllers and radar stations.'93
185. One commentator has suggested that pre-impact pain and suffering awards
are explained by the intensity of the mental anguish as opposed to its duration: "It
is the compression of fear within a few fleeting seconds of horror and panic." Fuchsberg,
supra note 9. at 2, col. 5.
186. Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 1-2.
187. See infra note 188.
188. Kaberon, Jury Hears DC-10 Crash Pre-Impact Issue, Chicago Daily Law
Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
189. See supra note 12.
190. Broder, supra note 115, at 425-26.
191. Id.
192. Shatkin, 727 F.2d at 206-07.
193. Broder, supra note 115, at 425-26.
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In DeYoung v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., plaintiff attempted to use
an animated version of Flight 191 recorded on videotape to illustrate
the path and position of the aircraft."' An alternative method of
establishing the erratic flight path of the plane is through the
eyewitness testimony of persons who viewed the plane from the
ground. 9 ' Information about the path and trajectory of the plane is
crucial in determining whether passengers experienced pre-impact ter-
ror.)96
But even if the plaintiff can establish that the decedent was
aware of impending death and experienced mental anguish, a ques-
tion remains as to the proper measure of damages.'97 In ordinary per-
sonal injury suits involving the loss of a limb or fractured bones, proof
of the existence of pain and suffering is relatively easy. 9 ' Usually the
plaintiff can testify as to what he felt, while treating physicians can
testify as to what they observed of the plaintiff's pain and suffer-
ing."'99 As stated throughout this note, special problems are presented
in pre-impact cases arising out of an air disaster because the lips of
the victims are sealed, and plaintiffs are unable to prove by eyewitness
testimony the extent of the decedent's suffering."' Indeed, no one will
every really know what passengers experience when it becomes ap-
parent that an aircraft is about to crash. °1 Likewise, it is difficult
for a jury to measure objectively exactly how much pain and suffer-
ing a plaintiff endures when he or she claims to have back pain. The
task of measuring any type of pain and suffering is a difficult one
for juries."2
194. No. 79 C 2790 (N.D. Ill. E.D. June 12, 1985) (available on WESTLAW, Allfeds
database).
195. Id.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 97-98.
197. See Solomon, 540 F.2d at 793 ($10,000 award for pre-impact damages was
if anything on the low side).
198. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 204 (1958).
199. Id. at 203-04.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
201. See Haley, 746 F.2d 311.
202. Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury
Litigation, 1962 DUKE L.J. 344 (for courtroom purposes we cannot really accurately
measure pain); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES S 88 (1935)
("Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance,
and not a process of measurement, and consequently the judge can, in his instruc-
tions, give the jury no standard to go by.") See also T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES S 171 (8th ed. 1891) (for pain and suffering there can be no
measure of compensation except for the arbitrary judgment of the jury); Botta v. Bruner,
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958) (no measure by which the amount of pain and suffering
endured can be calculated).
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Measuring damages for pre-impact pain and suffering is even
more problematic if one takes account of the fact that pain and suf-
fering are experienced in different degrees by different individuals
exposed to the same traumatic stimuli."' Justice Gee, the dissenting
judge in Solomon, argued that courts should not allow pre-impact
recovery because of the possibility that passengers who anticipate an
imminent crash may die the death of martyrs or have been confident
about a safe landing up until death."4 Admittedly, in such a situation
the varieties and degrees of possible reactions are almost infinite, each
as speculative as the next.'0 " However, the argument that pre-impact
damages are unmeasureable because of the differences in individual
responses to trauma seems largely irrelevant in the context of an im-
pending air disaster when one considers the overwhelming assault
on the passengers' psychic sensibilities. Each person has a breaking
point beyond which he cannot cope with the stress confronting him.00
In factual settings such as Yowell or Solomon, it is safe to assume
that the average person would experience severe emotional distress. 7
While the valuation of a decedent's pre-impact terror is a difficult
task, we intuitively sense that a person who is aware of impending
death endures excruciating mental anguish. Medical or psychiatric ex-
perts can assist the jury in evaluating a pre-impact claim by describ-
ing how the passengers may have responded to the realization of im-
pending disaster.0
A plaintiff seeking pre-impact damages may wish to introduce
expert psychiatric testimony as to passengers' physiological responses
to pre-impact terror. In Pregeant v. Pan American World Airways
Inc., a case arising out of the crash of Pan American Flight 759, plain-
203. Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL 7 (1977), reprinted
in 8 LAW MED. J. 207, 213 (1979-80).
204. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 797 (Gee, J., dissenting).
The simple fact is that not all human beings react with fear and terror
in times of peril. We humans are a spectrum and react differently in situa-
tions of danger. One man's meat of courage is another man's poison of
fear. We have different thresholds. Some of us are more stoical than others.
If a twentieth century Hamlet had been buckled to his fateful seat in
the [Lin] crash, and became aware of his peril, his reaction would be uncer-
tain, and, for all we know, he might be reciting the equivalent of 'To be
or not to be' when disaster struck.
Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 2, col. 6.
205. Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 2, col. 5-6.
206. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical
Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 201-02 (1976-77).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70, 127-29.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
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tiff's psychiatric expert testified about the physiological effects of
stress and described five levels of anxiety leading to panic."9 The ex-
pert described the final 20 seconds of the flight through the use of
a stopwatch, dramatically illustrating the passengers' pre-impact ter-
ror."' The jury awarded $16,000 for pre-impact pain and suffering.2'
In Haley, plaintiff's expert, a psychiatrist who had treated survivors
of plane accidents, testified that passengers aboard a plummeting air-
craft "would be in an absolute state of pandemonium, panic, and ex-
treme state of stress."2 '2 The role of the psychiatric expert in the pre-
impact case is to estimate the probable reaction of a normal individual
to extreme stress.2 3
Although expert testimony is helpful in measuring or evaluating
pre-impact pain and suffering, jurors for the most part must rely on
the arguments of counsel and their own common sense and experience
to fashion a reasonable award for pre-impact terror.2"4 Admittedly it
is difficult to objectively determine how much pre-impact pain and
suffering a particular decedent has endured. The jury must look to
the arguments of counsel for guidance. 21 In evaluating the proper
measure of damages for pre-impact pain and suffering, plaintiff's
counsel should consider the following factors: (1) the situation as it
appears to decedent; (2) the severity and probability of injury subjec-
tively contemplated by decedent; (3) probable accompanying physical
manifestations, if any, resulting from the threat of impending death;
(4) the character and habits of decedent; (5) evidence of decedent's
reaction to stress in other situations; (6) decedent's seating
assignment; and (7) whether decedent is an experienced airplane
passenger."6 The jury may not be able to arrive at a monetary figure
that is exactly equivalent to the amount of pre-impact pain and suf-
209. 762 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1985).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1247.
212. See Haley, 746 F.2d at 316.
213. See Moruzi, No. 79 C 4805 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1984) (Will, J.).
214. Werchick, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 263,
279 (1965-66) (pain and suffering can be converted into monetary terms by comparing
the character, severity, duration and effect of the pain, with concepts with which the
trier of fact is familiar).
215. The fear that juries will neglect to consider the evidence and award of
excessive pre-impact damages out of sympathy for the deceased passengers is allayed
by the following case. See Malacynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 565 F. Supp. 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Malacynski case arose out of the Flight 191 crash and was tried
in a New York Federal Court. The jury rejected the pre-impact pain and suffering
claim, awarding zero damages on this cause.
216. Broder, supra note 115, at 425-27.
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fering experienced by the decedent, but the jury has sufficient
evidence at its disposal to make an accurate estimate of damages." 7
A realistic valuation of damages in the pre-impact case, as in any other
case where the jury awards damages for pain and suffering, depends
on the juror's ability to draw upon his or her own common sense and
experience.1 ' Imagining how they themselves might have responded
to the situation enables jurors to render to the decedent the full
measure of justice to which he or she is entitled.
PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF PRE-IMPACT DAMAGES
While pre-impact awards will, in most cases, be relatively small,
proof of decedent's pre-impact mental anguish will have an appreciable
effect on the jury in its total assessment of damages.2" In air crash
cases, the defendant usually concedes liability and the trial is limited
to the issue of damages.22 In those cases, proof of pre-impact mental
anguish provides the jury with a sense of the mass suffering and death
engendered by the defendant's negligence."1 In the absence of a claim
for pre-impact damages, evidence such as National Traffic Safety Board
accident reports and expert testimony concerning the physiological
and psychological effects of terror is excluded from the jury's con-
sideration. 2 Perhaps the most significant consequence of allowing
plaintiffs to seek pre-impact damages is that evidence of a decedent's
pre-impact terror is likely to exert a gravitational pull on the jury's
calculations of pecuniary damages."
Plaintiffs' attorneys believe that proof of a decedent's pre-impact
terror is likely to evoke a favorable emotional response from jurors."
There is no better way to impress upon the jury the harsh reality
of an aviation disaster than through evidence of the passengers' pre-
impact pain and suffering.225 However, the attorney is cautioned to
avoid exaggeration and overkill which may alienate the jury.22 Com-
pensation for a decedent's pre-impact pain and suffering may be
217. Id.
218. See Werchick, supra note 214, at 279.
219. Broder, supra note 115, at 427.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 426-27.
222. Telephone interview with Terrence J. Lavin, attorney with the law firm
of Corboy & Demetrio, P.C. (Oct. 23, 1984).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Broder, supra note 115, at 426-27.
226. Kaberon, supra note 100, at 20, col. 2. Many attorneys are reluctant to
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viewed by some jurors as merely an unwarranted windfall to family
survivors.' Judicious use of pre-impact evidence provides jurors with
a realistic description of the circumstances of the wrongful death and
will assist them in arriving at a proper pecuniary verdict.2 '8
CONCLUSION
In the moments immediately preceding an air disaster, when it
becomes apparent that the aircraft is going to crash, airline passengers
are exposed to intolerable stress. The recent pre-impact cases arising
out of aviation accidents reflect judicial recognition that a tremen-
dous amount of mental anguish can be compressed into a few minutes
or seconds of terror. Recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering is
appropriate in situations where it is reasonable to infer that the dece-
dent was aware of impending death. Permitting plaintiffs to seek
recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering enables juries to render
to the decedent the full measure of justice to which he or she is
entitled.
DAVID L. FARNBAUCH
seek pre-impact damages in wrongful death cases. Attorney Phillip E. Howard, who
represented the widow and son of the Flight 191 pilot, gaining a $4.15 million dollar
verdict, stated he did not seek pre-impact damages because he was "afraid the jury
would think you were a pig."
227. Telephone interview with Terrence J. Lavin, attorney with the law firm
of Corboy & Demetrio, P.C. (Oct. 23, 1984).
228. Id.
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